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James Buckwalter 
Booth Library Research Award 
Shipboard Insurrections, the British Government and Anglo-American Society in the Early 
18th Century 
My research has focused on slave insurrections on board British ships in the early 18th 
century and their perceptions both in government and social circles. In all, it uncovers the stark 
differences in attention given to shipboard insurrections, ranging from significant concern in 
maritime circles to near ignorance in government circles. Moreover, the nature of discourse 
concerning slave shipboard insurrections differs from Britons later in the century, when British 
subjects increasingly began to view the slave trade as not only morally reprehensible, but an area 
in need of political reform as well. In the early century, on the other hand, Britons- some of 
whom occasionally chastised the slave trade and slavery as morally repugnant-fell short of 
calling for efforts to reform the system. In sum, these observations reveal elements critical to 
understanding the British world-view in the early 18th century, which was not yet ready to push 
beyond a simple moral criticism of the slave trade, a task that would be left for Britons of a later 
generation. 
Booth Library played an indispensable role in the course of this research, especially in 
the early stages. At the most basic level, the library provided nearly all of the secondary sources 
essential in forming the bedrock of my understanding of the British world in the 18th century, 
specifically its relation to the slave trade and the various obstacles presented to the slave trade. 
Digging deeper, the library's online databases provided a significant proportion of my primary 
sources. British Periodicals, arguably the most helpful, provided valuable sources concerning 
views on shipboard insurrections. Trial versions of Eighteenth Century Collections Online, too, 
provided a considerable amount of primary sources. Moreover, the Oxford Dictionary of 
National Biography provided important biographical information. Additionally, Early English 
Books Online and the Oxford English Dictionary were extremely helpful in research leading up 
to the present project-a project that extends and borrows from my previous research. Subject-
specific online databases (JSTOR, Historical Abstracts, and Project Muse) were helpful in 
locating nearly all articles used in this research. (See Bibliography attached as Exhibit "1"). 
Finally, Booth Library extended professional courtesies in helping me locate essential 
primary source British government documents housed at the University of Illinois at Urbana-
Champaign. These parliamentary documents supplied the foundation of my understanding of 
government reactions to slave shipboard insurrections. The remainder of my research took place 
in various archives and museums in and around London, England over the summer of2009. This 
research, supported by a Honors College Undergraduate Research Council Grant, and the 
documents ascertained in this last leg of my journey, however, could never have been found-
nor would have been relevant-without the sound and secure foundation of documents, both 
primary and secondary, encountered at Booth Library. 
Ultimately, the benefit of Booth Library's resources is displayed by the honors thesis that 
I was able to write. Dr. David Smith, one of the three faculty reviewers of my thesis, observed, it 
sought to answer "the historian's most difficult" task, "why something didn't happen." (A copy 
ofDr. Smith's memorandum is annexed as Exhibit "2"). My thesis advisor, Dr. Charles R. Foy, 
believed the thesis of sufficient merit to nominate it for College of Sciences Writing Award, 
while Newton Key, a second member of my thesis panel, is nominating the paper for the annual 
North American Conference ofBritish Studies Undergraduate Writing Award. I have little doubt 
that without the resources and support of Booth Library such honors for my work would not have 
been possible. 
"A Master's Care and Dilligence Should Never be Over:" the British Government and Slave 
Shipboard lnsurrectionsi 
James Buckwalter 
Captain Francis Messervy, first time captain on the slave ship Ferrers and perhaps overly ecstatic 
after his most recent successes at sea, maneuvered unprotected below deck to inspect his newly purchased 
Africans. As he lurched further down into the Ferrers , Messervy would have seen sailors whose duty it 
was to guard against insurrection and the three hundred or more Africans he had recently purchased 
following a war between two neighboring polities near Cetre-Crue. What Messervy perceived as good 
fortune, fellow captain William Snelgrave saw as cause for concern, noting that controlling "many 
Negroes of one Town and Language" had its inherent risks. These suspicions, borne from experience as a 
slave ship captain, proved correct a few months later when news on the Guinea coast highlighted a large-
scale insurrection aboard the Ferrers. Captains and tars alike shared tales of Africans who "beat out his 
[Messervy's] brains with the little Tubs," and ofthe ensuing battle in which nearly eighty Africans died.ii 
Despite perceptions among the British public concerning the transatlantic slave trade, slave 
insurrections such as that on the Ferrers in 1722 occurred quite frequently. The Transatlantic Slave 
Trade Database ("TASD") documents twenty-seven slave insunections occurring on British ships during 
1713-1743, as well as an additional five instances in which Africans attacked British slave ships near the 
coast-amounting to just over one instance per year. To be sure, the number of reported insurrections 
would increase as the century went on, in part due to an increase in slaving in regions associated with 
slave insurrections. However, the number of insunections in the early eighteenth-century was enough to 
significantly inhibit the profits of slave traders.iii What is more, the captains, officers, crew, and financiers 
of slaving voyages were aware of such insurrections and took considerable measures to prevent them. 
Captain William Snelgrave in his A New Account of Some Parts of Guinea and the Slave-Trade (1734), 
wrote extensively about slave shipboard insurrections. Snelgrave's autobiographical account discussed 
four slave insurrections over a period ofless than two decades.iv Moreover, in response to resistance by 
enslaved Africans, slave traders had by the early 181h century adopted numerous defense mechanisms. 
I 
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These included fortified settlements scattered on the African coast, increased manpower, and the 
barricado, a wooden barrier notorious on slavers for providing protection to seamen from rebelling 
slaves.v The public, too, had access to descriptions of insurrections at sea in periodicals. Most 
importantly, those who wrote about slave insurrections, including Royal Navy surgeon John Atkins, 
emphasized their importance and suggested methods of prevention. In fact, Atkins soberly noted in his 
reflections: "there has not been wanting Examples of rising and killing a Ship's Company ... but once or 
twice is enough to Shew, a Master's Care and Dilligence should never be over till the delivery ofthem."vi 
While many eighteenth-century slave ship captains may have been diligent about preventing slave 
insurrections, the frequency, impact, and transparency of slave insurrections have evaded the eyes-and 
pens--of historians until the last decade or so. This should be no surprise as British government papers, a 
significant source for slave trade historians, are largely silent on the issue. Undeterred by this, some 
historians have begun to analyze slave shipboard insurrections.vii Moreover, historians have shifted away 
from European-centered studies of the slave trade, opting instead for inquiries that focus on the victims, 
introducing a new perspective on the slave trade.viii For instance, Eric Taylor has carefully examined the 
frequency, magnitude, and success of shipboard insurrections, while David Richardson and Joseph Inikori 
have assessed insun-ections' economic effects and Stephanie Smallwood has provided an analysis of 
women's roles in slave ship insurrections. Lost in this maelstrom of historical analysis is the British 
government's silence in face of slave shipboard insun-ections and attacks by Africans on the coast and 
how, if at all, the status of race and anti-slavery in the early 181h century Britain relates to this silence. 
The British government's limited involvement in controlling shipboard insurrections is 
anomalous considering these incidents directly threatened the profits of influential British merchants and 
politicians. Instead, the government discussed taxing slaves, financing African forts, preventing 
insurrections in its colonies, suppressing piracy, and competing with the other European powers. In each 
of these instances, we see the British government concerned with issues inhibiting the profits of 
influential slave trade financiers. What emerges is a situation where the government failed to investigate 
shipboard insun-ections while simultaneously investigating the multiple enemies making similar attempts 
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to lessen the profits of the slave trade. In the end, the British government's silence regarding shipboard 
insutTections reflects a silence in British society on the the slave trade.ix While accounts of insurrections 
were made available to the public, the lack of concern given by the government reflects an inability by 
early 181h century Britons to make meaningful enquiries into the slave trade. 
The Slave trade and the Early Eighteenth-century 
Marcus Rediker defines mutiny as any "collective effort, planned or spontaneous, to curtail the 
captain' s power and, in the most extreme case, to seize control of the ship."x While Rediker refers to 
sailors and their attempts to resist rigid maritime class distinctions, his definition in many ways parallels 
attempts by Africans to resist the slave trade. Surely, both seamen mutinies and slave insmTections were 
collective efforts and both were occasionally planned. Seaman mutineers desired to seize power, as did 
African insurrectionists, although Africans desired a redistribution of power based on race while seamen 
desired one based on class.xi With this in mind, shipboard insurrections can be defined as any planned or 
spontaneous collective effort by Africans to resist European power or take control of slave ships. 
Similar instances, albeit more ambiguous, involve free coastal Africans attacking European slave 
ships. Often referred to as being "cut off," attacks like the one experienced by the Ruby in 1731 when she 
was "attacked by the natives" can be defined as any collective attempt by Africans to violently resist 
European involvement in the slave trade.xii Unfortunately, the historical record falls shoti of providing 
complete and accurate details for these instances. In the case ofthe Ruby, Francis Moore (a Royal African 
Company ("RAC") geographer) considered the events that took place an attack by native Africans; 
however, the New England Weekly Journal on March 20, 1732 noted that the captain was "purchasing 
Negroes" when they "finding an opportunity rose on the ship's company, kill'd Capt. Collwell, and run 
the ship on shore."xiii One possible explanation for this discrepancy holds that the New England Weekly 
Journal and Francis Moore had conflicting definitions of"natives" and "slaves."xiv Either way, these 
conflicting accounts are emblematic of the ambiguity surrounding instances of being "cut off." However, 
because the government similarly ignored these instances and because of the ambiguity surrounding these 
attacks, shipboard attacks and attacks by coastal Africans are combined for the purposes of this study. 
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The early 181h century provides an effective arena for examining shipboard insurrections. 
Broadly, the slave trade increased exponentially and, although it was a shadow of what it would later 
become, it was already an integral part of British economic and politicallife.xv Additionally, 1713 saw the 
end of the War of Spanish Succession, ushering in a quarter-century of relatively undisrupted peace. On 
the surface, the coming of peace would appear to liberate Parliament from issues of war and international 
competition, allowing other domestic and imperial issues to be discussed. In addition, one year prior to 
the treaty Parliament ended RAC's monopolist control over the trade. In terms of the slave trade, this 
meant that a Parliamentary "vacuum" was created.xvi Furthermore, with the burden of the free trade 
debates lifted, it would appear again that Parliament would have more opportunities to discuss the nature, 
effects, and prevention of shipboard insuiTections. Put another way, lacking the immediate threats of war 
and issues of how the slave trade would be run, the years after the Treaty of Utrecht appear to have 
opened new doors for Parliament to deal with threats to the slave trade, such as shipboard insuiTections. 
Peace, however, lacked staying power. By I 739 Britain was again at war with Spain. Yet the 
War of Jenkins' Ear (1739-1743) provides an important glimpse into the slave trade and the issues 
surrounding it during times of war. Being limited in nature (before it blossomed into the War of Austrian 
Succession) and at least partly growing out of international competition with the British and Spanish in 
the 1730s, the War of Jenkins' Ear therefore allows for a comparison between Parliamentary enquiries 
into shipboard insurrections during both war and peace. 
In contrast, traditional studies of the slave trade and its abolition have focused on the last half of 
the eighteenth-century or later. There are a number of reasons for this, most notably, the fact that the 
1720s and 1730s are some ofthe least documented decades ofthe slave trade. However, most historians 
relish a good challenge, so the lack of documentation does not fully explain the lack of historical enquiry. 
More importantly is the lack of a sustained, and well-organized enquiry into the slave trade. In contrast, 
the decades surrounding 1700 saw organized debate concerning the organizational nature ofthe slave 
trade and the latter eighteenth-century saw the organization of the abolition movement. By this overview, 
1713-43 seems like a period in which the slave trade was of little relevance to British authorities. 
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Yet the slave trade did matter. And it mattered to more than just the Jamaican merchant who 
referred to the "African trade" as "barbarous" and "inhuman." True, the merchant was arguing in favor of 
increased productivity, but he also asserted that "it has never yet throve, nor do I believe ever will, till 'tis 
manag'd with more Justice and Humanity."xvii Similarly, William Snelgrave and a host of other mariners 
wrote about the slave trade and the inherent dangers threatening its well-being and profitability, including 
slave insurrections, which in many cases "occasioned a terrible Destruction."xviii Moreover, historian 
Christopher L. Brown notes that "Anti-slavery sentiment did circulate in the early eighteenth-century," 
while conceding "organized efforts to abolish the slave system would not develop until much later."xix As 
these accounts suggest, the burgeoning slave trade of the early 181h century, despite Westminster's 
inattention and the lack of organized abolition movements, played a pivotal role in British society. Thus, 
the early eighteenth-century may prove to be the best place to examine the relationship between how both 
government officials and slave ship mariners regarded the threats that accompanied the slave trade. 
The volume of the British slave trade in the early eighteenth-century experienced many hills and 
valleys. The TASD identifies 2,053 British slave voyages during the period 1713-43-an average of 68.4 
voyages each year. When broken into smaller periods ( 1713-1715, then five successive five year periods 
followed by 1741-1743), we uncover that the late 1720s and the late 1730s experienced the highest yearly 
averages, with 76.6/year and 80.8/year respectively. On the other hand, in 1713-1715 an average of only 
thirty-two slave ships sailed each year.xx Taking into account the two years prior to 1713 and the years 
after 1739, the data suggests that war had at least some effect on the volume of the slave trade. Overall, 
the number of embarked slaves roughly accelerated during 1713-15, 1718-20, 1724-26, 1729-31, and 
1736-38, and declined in the remaining years, followed by a general decrease after war broke out. In all, 
the volume of the slave trade during this period appears to be one characterized by alternating 2-4 year 
periods of increase and decline. At the very least, insufficient record keeping during this period renders it 
impossible to cite a precise number of ships sailed or slaves embarked. Moreover, threats from other 
European powers, pirates, and natural disasters figure prominently into the number of slaves embarked 
each year. With this in mind, however, the average recorded number of slaves embarked during 1735-39 
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indicates that nearly 26,000 slaves were transported annually compared to a paltry 15,000 per year during 
1713-16, a significant increase in slave trading during the early 18th century. 
Detailing Shipboard Insurrections 
A total of thirty-three instances of shipboard insurrections or attacks by coastal Africans between 
1713 and 1743 have been uncovered by review ofthe TASD, newspaper reports and Eric Taylor's If We 
Must Die.xxi This means that 1.6% of British slave ships during our period experienced a recorded slave 
insurrection or attack by coastal Africans. Some factors clouded those figures , including port and 
financial records, from which much ofthe data available concerning specific voyages (TASD) comes, and 
the underreported nature of shipboard insuiTections.xxii This is not surprising. Captains had near 
authoritarian rule and a vested interest in protecting their reputation. xxiii For many, this may have 
included covering up incidents of ship insurrection. While agents in the Atlantic world as well as ship 
captains often relayed information back to London concerning other ships, agents of correspondence were 
sparse while at sea. Under these circumstances, successful-or unsuccessful but non-deadly-slave 
insurrections might never be reported. In all, any figures on slave ship insmTections can never be fully 
accurate. Despite these murky waters, Behrendt, Eltis, and Richardson hazard a guess at the true 
percentage of slave shipboard insuiTections. They postulate that, accounts of entire voyages taken by 
officials at Nantes from 1715-1777, the figure is likely closer to 10% than 2%.xxiv What is accurate, 
therefore, is the prevalence of slave insurrections on British slave ships in the early 18th century. 
If slave insurrections occulTed on nearly one in ten slave ships, where then did they occur? 
Traditionally, ship captains and historians have concluded that insuiTections were most likely to occur 
near the African coast. While discussing the process of enslavement, Snelgrave noted that he would 
unfasten the slaves' irons "soon after we have sail'd from the coast".xxv Snelgrave's conduct was 
consistent with the view of many captains that, "all the Time he [the captain] lied there [on the coast of 
Africa] he runs the Hazard of the Sickness and Rebellion of those Slaves he already has, they being apter 
to rise in a Harbour than when out at Sea."xxvi In response, ship captains often rushed their slaving 
procedures to prevent the "increased" risk of mutiny near the coast of Africa. xxvii In the face of such 
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convincing assessments of the slave trade, historians have recently differed on the issue. Eric Taylor has 
emphasized that reduced manpower near the coast, both due to sickness and European activity on the 
coast of Africa, led slave ships to become increasingly susceptible to rebellion.xxviii Others have disagreed. 
David Richardson notes that slave ships often spent nearly twice as much time on the coast than at sea, 
providing a possible explanation the notion that insurrections occurred more frequently near the coasexix 
Another dimension of the location of slave shipboard insurrections manifests itself in the 
ethnicity of Africans. Snelgrave observed that determining ethnicities were key to understanding revolts. 
When conversing about the insurrection on Captain Messervy's Ferrers, he noted that Messervy had been 
naive having "had on board so many Negroes of one Town and Language, it required the utmost Care and 
Management to keep them from mutinying."xxx John Atkins hinted at the magnitude of ethnicity, noting 
that "Slaves differ in their goodness, those from the Gold Coast are accounted best.. .an Angolan negro is 
a proverb for worthlessness."xxxi Exactly why the Angolans were described as worthless is uncertain; 
however, with Atkins' previous experience with slave insurrections, it is possible that their tendency to 
rebel affected their worth. David Richardson, too, has observed that many captains believed the location 
of slaving significant; "European shippers of slaves believed that members of some ethnic groups were 
more prone to rebel than others."xxxii While cautioning that his research is tentative, Richardson postulates 
that the breakdown of political economies may have influenced African rebelliousness toward their 
European captors. Specifically, his analysis of the slaving and politics of the Senegambia region suggest 
that increased slave trading may have contributed to "a breakdown of political authority," which induced 
groups within Senegambia to lash out against slave ships.xxxiii While these assertions remain tentative they 
nonetheless underline one of the key features of slave shipboard insurrections: regional differentiation. 
In addition to location ofthe ship and ethnicity of its slaves, ship captains and modem historians 
alike have desired knowledge of the specific circumstances of rebellion. Eric Taylor supplies the most 
comprehensive assessment ofthese circumstances.xxxiv To begin, attacks from pirates or other warships 
could provide enough of a distraction for slaves to revolt. In the case of the Elizabeth in 1721, Snelgrave 
noted that the Captain and Mate were dead and the ship, "had afterwards been taken to Cape Lahoe ... by 
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Roberts the pirate," until order was finally restored to the second mate.xxxv Realizing that this turbulent 
course of events could lead to rebellion, Snelgrave attempted to force his way with the new captain, 
suggesting that he hand over all his slaves to Snelgrave. Fearing a mutiny from his sailors, the new 
captain refused Snelgrave's advice. Mutiny would come, however, but from slaves rather than seamen. 
Snelgrave's account of the Elizabeth thus illustrates that political instability, brought on by skirmishes 
with pirates or other European ships, could incite a group of slaves to rebel. 
Attacks from pirates and warships were not the only forces that could interfere with the political 
stability of a slave ship. Bad weather, which often forced sailors on deck to navigate and repair damage, 
could provide a sufficient distraction to incite to a revolt. Slaves also took advantage of a calm night, as 
did those on the ship Martha, who "had form'd a Design to surprise the Crew in the Night Time."xxxvi 
Moreover, many slaves took advantage ofthe relaxed atmosphere at mealtimes to revolt. On the Ferrers 
in 1721, the slaves rose while eating, using "little Tubs" that held the slaves' food to assault the 
sailors.xxxvii This incident speaks to the dangerous nature of mealtimes; slaves were not only unchained 
and congregated together, but given instruments that could be used as weapons as well. 
Despite the plethora of precautions taken by slave ship personnel, captain and crew negligence 
hastened insurrections. In fact, Eric Taylor contends that crew negligence the most common factor in 
slave shipboard insurrections. On the Ann and Pricilla in 1716, the crew, forgetting that they left pieces 
of wood lying on the deck, brought slaves on deck to hoist the vessel's boat. The slaves, taking advantage 
oftheir situation, used the pieces of wood to kill the captain and take control ofthe ship.xxxviii Five years 
later, aboard the Cape Coast, slaves took advantage of Captain Wilson venturing ashore to kill a seaman 
and a boy. RAC agents criticized the Captain's foolishness, declaring that "it would be a very 
unaccountable history that Thitieen men & four boys Slaves should attempt to rise upon Seven White 
Men was it not that it seems they were all out of Irons by ye Master's orders."xxxix Similarly, William 
Snelgrave assigned blame to the captain, "who by his over-care, and too great kindness to the Negroes on 
board his Ship, was destroyed by them."x1 In shmi, the captain's lax procedures, absence from the ship, 
and "over-care" toward slaves all commonly led to slave shipboard insurrections. 
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While relaxed rule could bring rebellion, "ill usage" of slaves could similarly cause revolt. In 
order to prevent mutinies, Snelgrave declared it "my principle care, to have the Negroes on board my ship 
kindly used."xli Likewise, rumors frequently spread through the slaves' quatters that their white masters 
would eat them. Believing these "nonsensical Falsities," as Captain Japhet Byrd termed them, meant that 
preemptive strikes by the slaves were possible if they perceived an imminent threat to their safety. xiii 
What is more certain, however, is that slaves aboard slave ships often revolted due to their desire 
for freedom. In their quest, nearly one quarter of slave insurrections resulted in freedom for at least one 
slave.xliii In 1729, the slaves on the Clare Galley revolted near the Gold Coast and took control of its 
firearms and gunpowder. This convinced the captain and crew that defeat was inevitable, causing them to 
flea in a longboat. Exactly what occurred after this is subject to debate, however, we do know that some 
slaves found the freedom they were looking for and that the ship was eventually blown up.xiiv 
Each of these possible explanations of slave shipboard insurrections-desiring freedom, taking 
advantage of the time, location, "ill usage," or relaxed control-fails to acknowledge the slave trade's 
violent nature. To be sure, violence employed by Europeans to buttress the slave trade provides the 
clearest explanation for African violence in their attempts to destroy the Transatlantic slave trade system. 
Arguably the best support of this claim comes not from instances of slave insurrection but from methods 
employed by Africans on shore to resist the slave trade. The Balanta people migrated to the coast to 
escape the grasp of the Muslim slave trade, where terrain and coastal diseases served as a defense. 
Similarly, Tabancas, or high-walled villages were built by many African societies to resist the slave 
trade.'1v John Oriji identifies a number of measures of resistance, including poisoning the food and drink 
of slave traders, building walled cities, engaging in armed combat, erecting elaborate roadblocks, and 
banding together in common defense.xlvi Africans also employed panyarring (attacking European slave 
ships) to secure control of a ship or to retrieve an enslaved family member.xlvii 
As these examples show, Africans responded similarly to a variety of different encroachments. 
They fortified their cities, poisoned food, and engaged in armed combat to discourage slave traders. In 
short, the commonality in each of these instances is the encroachments and violence of the slave trade, not 
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the other factors described above. True, acts of slave shipboard insunections could depend on issues such 
as the time, the location, and the presence-or absence-of Europeans, but the underlying cause of 
rebellion was the violence of the slave trade system, not the immediate factors preceding each act. 
With this in mind, slave shipboard insurrections could end any number of ways. The most 
common outcome was a failure to take control ofthe ship. The Sylvia Galley (1715), Robert (1721), 
Elizabeth (1721 ), Ruby (1723), Industry (1729), and countless others suffered this fate. On the Industry, a 
slave woman was found attempting to smuggle gunpowder and ammunition through a small hole in the 
wall separating the men's and women's quarters. To tenorize other slaves, the crew shot the woman 
multiple times after her capture and dropped her into the sea.xlviii Eight years earlier, on the Elizabeth, 
William Snelgrave gathered the captains of slave ships to decide on the fate of a slave who confessed to 
an insurrection and murder of the ship's cooper. The captains decided that Snelgrave should "put him to 
death" to "prevent future Mischiefs." Snelgrave had "all their Negroes upon Deck at the time of 
Execution," at which time the slave was beheaded and thrown overboard.xiix 
Slave insurrections occasionally ended in the complete destruction ofthe slave ship. In 1742 
Captain Nathaniel Roberts and the Mary's entire crew were killed in a slave insurrection that resulted in 
freedom for the slaves and the ship entirely destroyed.' When slaves aboard the Dolphin revolted in 1735, 
the ship exploded resulting in death for all on board.1i Astonishingly, seven crewmembers survived the 
Victorious Anne's explosion after her slaves rose in rebellion.lii In all, there are four cases in which slave 
insunections led to the destruction of the ship in our period. By these admittedly incomplete numbers we 
can surmise that over 10% of slave shipboard insunections led to the destruction of a slaver. 
In spite ofthis, not all insunections led to failure. Nearly one-quarter ofinswTections resulted in 
freedom for at least one slave. However, not all successes were similar. !iii An August 28, 1717letter 
Drewry Ottley gives a "melancholy acc't of that unfortunate ship," the Anne Galley. The letter notes 
Captain Clarke's untimely death in June 1717 in the Gambia River. Taking advantage, the slaves rose in 
July, resulting in the deaths of all but sixteen slaves. Nonetheless, six slaves later managed to jump 
overboard and escape to freedom near the island of Montserrat.1iv On September 6, 1721, slaves aboard 
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the Cape Coast took advantage of Captain Wilson's absence, running the sloop ashore. For seven of the 
seventeen who left the ship alive, freedom was gained.1v Running a ship ashore after wresting control 
from whites represents another common outcome of slave shipboard insurrections. Just as slaves 
occasionally gained control of a vessel, they could subsequently lose control of the vessel. While little is 
known about the 1739 insurrection aboard the Expedition, we do know that slave deaths were substantial, 
and that the ship was eventually re-captured by the crew.1vi Thus, declaring slaves the "victor" in their 
rebellions would give little indication of events that transpired. Even when slaves did gain complete 
control of the vessel, many could have died during the struggle or could be subsequently re-captured. 
These examples roughly canvass the spectrum of possible outcomes of slave shipboard 
insurrections. For historians the picture is imprecise as there is insufficient information for the number of 
slave shipboard insurrections. For example, on August 30, 1739, slaves aboard the Princess Carolina 
revolted killing some seamen. And yet the subsequent fate of the remaining slaves, crew, and captain are 
unknown.1vii Moreover, Captain Richard Sayers of the Anne and Pricilla (1716) allowed slaves on deck to 
assist the crew. After finding pieces of stray wood lying on the deck, they rose, killed Sayers, and took 
control of the vessel. Even though the ship was near Gambia, the fate ofthe crew, the ship, the slaves, 
and their endeavors for freedom are unknown.1viii So, while slave insurrections resulted in myriad 
outcomes, the fates ofmany confirmed cases of slave insurrections are shrouded in mystery. 
Major Publications and Slave Shipboard Insurrections 
As we have seen, slave shipboard insurrections came in a number of forms, resulted from a 
multitude of situations, and had diverse outcomes. This is evident from the accounts of slave shipboard 
insurrections by various Britons in their personal correspondence, business correspondence, publications, 
and periodicals discussed above. However, these few examples do not represent fully the entire scope of 
knowledge that Britons received concerning insurrections. For that, we look deeper into the world of 
publications, newspaper articles, and RAC and South Sea Company ("SSC") correspondence. 
Men involved in the slave trade wrote detailed accounts of insurrections in major publications. 
While they provide detail and specificity, there exists only three major published works during 1713-1743 
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that deal at length with slave shipboard insun·ections. Arguably the most detailed, William Snelgrave's A 
New Account of Some Parts of Guinea and the Slave-Trade (1734), has proven immensely useful for 
slave trade historians.1ix Snelgrave enjoyed success in his ventures and survived nearly three decades in 
the violent world of slave trading to publish his accounts. A separate trader, Snelgrave seemed to be 
popular among his peers and merchants in London (he dedicated his work to the London Merchants). 
A New Account takes the reader on an epic journey through the violence of the transatlantic slave 
trade. Snelgrave's account begins with his first voyage to Old Calabar in 1704, details his service on the 
Anne in the last year of the War of Spanish Succession, followed by his capture by pirates in 1718, and 
describes his trading at Whydah in 1727 and 1729.1x Snelgrave incorporates a detailed discussion of slave 
mutinies, including methods of prevention and, early on, places mutinies at the center of his discussion by 
providing a small anecdote as a preface to his accounts. He recalls an instance while on the coast of 
Africa in which, appalled by the Africans' attempt to sacrifice a small child, he buys the child. Upon 
returning to his ship, the captain notices that one of his slaves is the child's mother. The mother-and the 
rest of the slaves-see this reunion as an act of goodwill on the part of Snelgrave, who notes that 
following this act, the slaves held "a good notion of white men; so that we had no Mutiny in our ship, 
during the whole voyage."1xi By initiating his work with this tale, Snelgrave embraces the centrality of 
rebellion (and the importance of preventing rebellion) in the life ofthe slave ship captain. 
Following a general discussion of slave trading ventures, Snelgrave arrives on the topic of mutiny 
once again, declaring that slave mutinies were generally brought on by "ill usage" of the slaves. In 
contrast, treating the slaves with "humanity and tenderness" would limit the possibility of mutinies as 
well as preserve the health ofslaves.1xii Tenderness and humanity would not always suffice, however. 
Occasionally, Snelgrave would meet with "stout stubborn people," who despite "being kindly used" 
"nevertheless mutinied." This was the case in 1721 aboard the slave ship Henry. When the crew 
discovered slaves attempting to mutiny, Snelgrave opted for leniency, agreeing not to punish them. A 
few days later, however, one of the ship's African linguists unearthed another plot to revolt. After this, 
Snelgrave admits "uneasiness, for I knew several voyages had proved unsuccessful by Mutinies."1xiii 
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In all, Snelgrave's accounts of mutinies "that have ended in a very tragi cal manner" had the 
potential to serve as a gentle warning to his fellow traders and merchants. Additionally, while Parliament 
focused on attempts to maximize profits by dealing with pirates, European competition, and the duties 
imposed by African traders, personal accounts, like Snelgrave's, took a starkly different stance by 
focusing on the ability to manage the slave population and prevent rebellion. For Snelgrave, duties, 
European traders, and even pirates posed little threat to the slave trade regime when compared to the 
threat of slave mutiny. Snelgrave even refers to the pirate Davis as a "generous friend. ,Ixiv While one 
should not confuse these sentiments with overall goodwill toward pirates, Snelgrave clearly places the 
threat of slave shipboard insurrection on par with, or above, the threat posed by piracy.1xv 
Francis Moore's Travels into the Inland Parts of Africa offers a similar dynamic between threats 
posed by pirates, duties, Europeans, and slave shipboard insurrections. Moore essentially writes to 
articulate the importance of government funding of RAC forts and castles in Africa to the continued well-
being ofthe slave trade. Yet unlike other RAC writers, Moore takes account of slave shipboard 
insurrections. On November 14, 1730, for example, Moore notes that "about midnight our Ensign was 
called down by the Centinels, who were then on Duty, in order to prevent the Slaves from making their 
Escape [from the Guinea]." The following month he notes the John and Anne was "seized by the Natives" 
due to "not paying his Customs to the King of Barrah."1xvi In April 1732, after leaving Yanimarew, Moore 
heard tales of a "New England Scooner. .. cut off by the Natives."1xvii Finally, on February 5, 1733, 
Captain Williams' slaves rose, "killed a great Part of the Ship's Crew; the Captain himself had his Fingers 
cut by them in a miserable Manner, and it was with great Difficulty he escaped being killed."Ixviii Travels, 
therefore, argues for government funding to RAC castles and forts and uses instances of slave resistance 
as evidence. What is more, by employing Moore, the RAC implicitly sanctioned the use of such 
instances as evidence-an interesting decision, especially considering that MPs (whom this work is no 
doubt directed towards) rarely acknowledged these threats to the slave trade. 
Finally, John Atkins echoes some of Snelgrave's and Moore's themes in his 1737 A Voyage to 
Guinea, Brasil, and the West-Indies. To begin, Atkins characterizes the relations between Europeans and 
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Africans as one of"mutual distrust," and in Snelgravian fashion, explicitly warns captain and crew to "to 
treat them with all Gentleness and Civility."1xix In the case of the Dove, Atkins notes the commonplace 
occurrence ofpanyarring.1xx To add, Atkins, like Snelgrave and Moore, leaves the reader with a grim 
reminder of the dangers of insurrection by debunking the common assumption that "the Negroes 
Ignorance of Navigation will always be a safeguard," warning instead that "there has not been wanting 
examples of rising and killing a Ship's Company." Finally, Atkins concludes that "once or twice is 
enough to Shew, a Master's Care and Dilligence should never be over till the delivery" of the slaves.1xxi 
In short, Snelgrave, Moore, and Atkins provide Britons with astounding accounts of the danger 
associated with the slave trade. In each example, the author provides both warnings and suggestions to 
prevent violence. Moreover, each characterizes the threats of insurrections and attacks from coastal 
Africans on par with the threats acknowledged by Parliament (piracy, European competition, and African 
coastal duties). With these three examples in mind, popular publications regarding the slave trade tended 
to emphasize insurrections and attacks by coastal Africans as a central feature of the slave trade system. 
Periodicals and Slave Shipboard Insurrections 
The publications detailed above appealed to diverse audiences. Snelgrave wrote for London 
Merchants. Moore wrote for MPs and influential members of government. Atkins, in all likelihood, 
wrote for both. And while the ordinary Briton may have occasionally stumbled across these accounts, the 
main avenue for information about the slave trade was periodicals. Publishing numerous accounts of slave 
shipboard insurrections-although not as numerous as accounts of piracy or international competition-
periodicals represented the most likely place Britons learned about such instances. 
Periodical accounts of slave shipboard insurrections often reached the level of detail apparent in 
published accounts but rarely presented the insightful discussions apparent in the latter. A typical 
newspaper account might be as short as this September 151h, 1730 account in the London Daily Post: "Our 
Merchants receiv'd Advice, that the Ship Queen Caroline was lately lost ofthe Coast ofGuinea."1xxii On 
the other hand, some could run for paragraphs, providing incredible narratives and succinct historical 
detail. Moreover, periodical accounts often appeared in multiple periodicals. For example, editors of the 
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Maryland Gazette printed news of the Queen Caroline revolt over a year before and with much more 
detail that the London Daily Post dispatch. Readers of the Maryland Gazette, therefore, could read of the 
Grometto who betrayed Captain Halladay by persuading the "purchased Negroes to rise." When the 
slaves set out to take over the ship, "One [slave] took an Iron Bar out of the Fire-Hearth, with which he 
killed the Captain, and all the rest were soon murdered."1xxiii The dual accounts of the insurrection in both 
London and colonial periodicals speak to the "Atlantic" nature of slave shipboard insurrections. 
An equally detailed account of shipboard insurrections appears in London's Daily Journal on 
July 4, 1729. After receiving a letter from aboard the Industry, the publishers printed the detailed account 
outlining the slaves' plan "to rise upon the Ship's [Martha] Crew," by making themselves "Masters of 
Gunpowder, Muskets, Shot etc." Unfortunately for the slaves, the rebellion failed and one captured 
female slave, being unfit for the market, was chosen for punishment. The crew "hoisted her up to the Fore 
Yard Arm, in View of the other Slaves (who they had disarm' d) and fired half a Dozen Balls thro' her 
Body; the last Shot that was fired cut the Rope which she was slung by, so that she tumbled .. .into the Sea 
at once." Naturally terrified, the remaining slaves arrived at Barbados without any major disturbances.Ixxiv 
Like most accounts of shipboard insurrection in London's papers, this account appears in not one, but 
many periodicals, including the London Evening Post, the Weekly Journal, and the London Journal.Ixxv 
The Queen Caroline and the Martha represent two of the many slave insurrections aboard British 
ships that found their ways into colonial newspapers. The insurrection aboard the Ruby, for example, 
appeared in the New England Weekly Journal in March 1732.1xxvi Similarly, the Dove, "was surprised by 
the Negroes they were trading with, who destroyed the ship, and murdered all her crew, except one of her 
mates," an account of which appeared in the American Weekly Mercury in early 1733.1xxvii Not 
surprisingly, then, accounts of insurrections aboard colonial ships often reached London papers. In 
October, 1730, an extract of an affidavit of Peter Harlee, who served on the William of Boston, appeared 
in the Weekly Register. In the affidavit Harlee states that "the Negro Slaves rose, killed the master and 
eight men." Harlee was left alive with two boys in order to sail the ship back to Africa, and by feeding the 
slaves "Opium in Wine and Water" was able, with some assistance, to retake the ship and execute the 
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leaders of the slave insurrection.1xxviii Again, these accounts show insurrections in a decidedly Atlantic 
light; Britons, both in Britain and its colonies, read about issues relating to slave shipboard insurrections. 
Company Correspondence and Slave Shipboard Insurrections 
While published accounts of the slave trade and periodicals often featured discussions of slave 
shipboard insurrections, the RAe and SSe, in their official papers, dealt with insurrections on a much 
more implicit level. If, for the purpose of this argument, we envision British slave trading society as a 
hierarchy with those directly involved with the slave trade (captains, crew, etc.) at the bottom, 
government-affiliated companies (the RAe and SSC) in the middle, and MPs and government officials at 
the top, those at the bottom acknowledged slave shipboard insmTections far more often than those nearer 
the top. Insurrections deeply troubled captains and seamen enough to lead them to publish their accounts 
or send news of insurrections to London and colonial periodicals. The RAe and sse, while concerned 
with insurrections, discussed them much less explicitly. MPs rarely acknowledged these incidents. 
Instructions to slave ship captains often provided a useful arena to discuss insurrections; to be 
sure, many RAe letters of instruction hinted at the possibility of insurrection. Instructions to the captain 
ofthe Oxford (1712) emphasized a secure placement ofthe ship's gunpowder and the captain taking 
"good care of the Negroes."1xxix From these suggestions, one might be able to logically infer that RAe 
officials feared someone, crew or slave, using the ship's armaments for ill. Moreover, humane treatment 
of slaves serves the dual purposes of ensuring that slaves could be sold and guaranteeing the safety of the 
crew. One year later, RAe officials cautioned the captain of the Joanna to "always keep a good guard 
both at sea and in port to prevent surprise."1xxx Once again, officials fell short of explicitly discussing 
slave rebellion, yet their warnings infer that the RAe considered slave insurrections a pressing issue. 
More explicitly, Pindar Galley records evidence that officials counseled the captain to keep "a watchfull 
eye over the negroes ... that they ... be prevented from doing any mischief.1xxxi 
RAe instructions to their captains followed a loose pattern from 1704 to around 1720, often 
including individualized warnings to captains of the dangers of the voyage. The cases of the Oxford, 
Joanna, and Pindar Galley, documented above, represent examples of these; each captain was warned 
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about various dangers, most notably ensuring the docility of their crew and slaves. Around 1720, 
however, ship instructions begin to follow a much stricter pattern. In fact, many instructions are not fully 
copied into the RAC record books.1xxxii Instead, they were abbreviated, suggesting that by this time, the 
RAC began to formalize its records. Further evidence of this increased formality comes in the form of an 
outline for all instructions at the beginning of RAC record books. After 1720, RAC instructions all began 
to follow this outline more strictly. Additional changes following this increased formality include an 
increased focus on documentation of the ship's progress. For example, the RAC initiated a requirement 
to captains to "take notice of all Negroes ... on board your ship" and to "number them [slaves], and enter 
every such number, with their quality, into the book."1xxxiii Officers, too, were required to sign the book to 
ensure its validity. The RAC additionally required all captains to "render Us an account in writing of 
1. 
every particular taken on board your ship," and within ten days of arriving in London to deliver the record 
book to RAC Sub Governor or Deputy Governor.Ixxxiv In short, formalization ofRAC instructions focused 
more energy on the documentation of events of the voyage. With this in mind, the RAC, in implicitly 
warning its captains of insurrections and requiring draconian documentation of their voyages surely had 
significant knowledge of slave shipboard insurrections. Yet despite this, the RAC and SSC rarely, if ever, 
mentioned insurrections explicitly in their correspondence with factors and agents in the Atlantic world. 
An examination ofRAC Committee of Correspondence records provides further evidence ofthe 
RAC's implicit concern for slave insurrections and attacks by coastal Africans. For example, in 
September 1713, the RAC sent Captain William Cooke and thirty-two individuals, thirteen of which were 
soldiers, to Gambia Fort in order to "give security."Ixxxv Nearly two years later, the RAC agreed to 
"Draught of a petition to her Majesty for some Naval Force to be sent to Africa."Ixxxvi Another regiment 
was sent to Cape Coast Castle in February, 1716; once again, the largest portion of the men sent (68) was 
a group of soldiers (25).1xxxvii To be sure, soldiers played an integral part of preserving order at RAC forts 
and castles. Of the nine salaried staff at Dixiecove, five were soldiers, a ratio which appears to be close to 
the norm. While the larger forts generally housed less military personnel as a proportion of total 
Europeans, the average fort had a military/non-military personnel ratio of 67:100 as of August, 1723.1xxxviii 
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Despite the RAC's implicit acknowledgment of slave shipboard insurrections and attacks by 
coastal Africans, some evidence of reported insurrections appears in RAC letters. On September 30, 1721 
Cape Coast Castle factors wrote to the RAC, telling of"the night the Slaves took the opportunity of the 
Capt. Being on Shoar and the People's Negligence to rise upon them." The slaves killed one man and a 
boy, but managed to take control of the vessel and run it ashore. The ship captain being on shore, 
"procured the assistance of the Towns People," to re-capture some of the slaves.Ixxxix In other words, the 
RAC had at least some knowledge of slave shipboard insurrections on board their ships-knowledge that 
would not translate into explicit RAC, or governmental, concern. 
Rather than establishing explicit concern for shipboard insurrections, the RAC, like Parliament, 
focused much of its efforts on eliminating or containing the disastrous effects of piracy, European 
competition, and coastal duties. While instructing the Oxford's captain the RAC noted that pirates 
"frequently infest the Coast of Africa."xc When factors requested an additional man of war to patrol the 
African coast, they cited a need to protect English forts and ships from "pirates on the coast."xci Moreover, 
on January 251\ 1721, RAC's Committee of Trade and Correspondence took account of"the loss upon 
the Onslow" captured by pirates.xcii The next year, the same committee considered Captain Stoakes' (of 
the Guinea) "Sufferings when taken by the pirates."xciii The SSC engaged in similar actions regarding 
damages to its ships by pirates. In 1717 the SSC declared that it was "not chargeable with Freight for the 
Twenty Eight negroes taken out of the Royal Africa Captn. Foott by the Pyrates."xciv In other words, the 
RAC and the SSC spent considerable efforts attempting to control the effects of piracy on the slave trade 
in the absence of explicitly tackling the problems posed by slave shipboard insurrections. 
European competition, too, played a large role in RAC efforts to maximize the slave trade. 
Instructions to William Parr requested that he become informed on the "pretensions of the French to the 
sole Trade ofPortodaily."xcv Additional enquiries into the trade at Portodally were made on February 28, 
1715, when the Committee of Trade sought to debunk the French claims of the "sole right to trade" in the 
region.xcvi The threat ofthe French involved serious consequences. In late July, 1714, the Committee of 
Correspondence investigated accounts ofRAC ships "taken by the French in and about the River 
Buckwalter 19 
Gambia," and resolved to "make a charge" for the "losses the Company sustain'd."xcvii The RAC also 
instructed Martin Bladen, newly appointed Commissary to His Majesty, "to procure Satisfaction" for the 
"considerable Damages by the Depredations made by the French in time ofpeace."xcviii 
The Dutch and Spanish presented similar threats to the RAC and the slave trade as a whole. In 
1722, the Committee of Trade and Correspondence ordered that affidavits be taken for men aboard the 
Unity, which was "taken by the Spanish Privateer." Two years later, the RAC's Committee of Trade 
wrote to the SSC enquiring "in relation to the Negroes taken ... in the Ship Unity."xcix The same 
committee, in 1721, discussed "part of the letter from Cape Coast Castle" which disclosed a description 
of a Dutch ship "seizing ... the Hanibal & Dispatch, two ofthe Camp. Ships."c With this in mind, piracy 
and European competition concerned the RAC to a considerable degree and may help to explain the near 
absence of explicit discussions of slave shipboard insurrections. 
British Government and Slave Shipboard Insurrections 
Like the RAC's peculiar relationship with slave shipboard insurrections, the British Government 
rarely discussed these numerous and destructive incidents. In some sense, this should not be a surprise. 
In fact, Christopher L. Brown asserts; "From 1713-1787, when the British slave trade reached its apex, 
the traffic in African captives only rarely became the subject of sustained discussion in parliament."ci 
However, Brown's article considers the slave trade as a whole, and concedes a number of exceptions to 
this rule. To be sure, while our period (1713-1743) revealed no sustained enquires into the method of 
trading slaves, the British Government, including parliament, exerted considerable energy toward 
addressing threats to the slave trade. By and large, these included piracy, European competition, and, 
possibly as an extension of the previous two, funding for the operation of British establishments on the 
coast of Africa. With this in mind, the government's systematic failure to address slave shipboard 
insurrections, which impacted the profits of the slave trade on a massive scale, is very peculiar indeed. 
Maintenance of forts in Africa and the West Indies provided the most common and direct avenue 
for the British Government to address the slave trade. On March 9, 1714, for example, the Colonial 
Office petitioned Lord Bolingbroke for continued support for the fort at Port Royal, citing its importance 
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"for the security and defence by H.M. ships, of the Island, and the trade thereof."cii Similarly, the Board of 
Trade informed the Colonial Office in March 1726 that at the present time, "Forts and Settlements ... are 
not capable of protecting the ships of your Majesty's subjects," thereby establishing a grave need for 
government fundingciii Two months later, a Captain "Snelgrove" (possibly the William Snelgrave 
discussed earlier) addressed the Board of Trade and Plantations, asserting that the "present forts and 
settlements" remained in "bad condition," to the "great disadvantages" of the slave trade.civ A few days 
earlier, a Captain Bonhan testified to the "mean condition of the forts."cv 
Similarly, the House of Commons ("HOC") discussed issues relating to forts. In 1729, the HOC 
requested an account of the condition of the various African forts and castles, including the quantity and 
names of the employees. In February, 1730, the Commons requested an estimate for the maintenance and 
defense of the African forts, a request they repeatedly made in subsequent years. cvi Moreover, in 
February, 1743, the HOC estimated that during the 1730s such costs averaged around £12,000 per year.cvii 
One of the main reasons for concern over the establishment and continued maintenance of forts-
aside from the RAC's attempts to stop hemorrhaging money-was the incessant attacks by pirates on 
slave ships. In concordance with this, the secretary of the Colonial Office appealed for "one or more of 
H.M. ships" in order to protect Jamaica from "the great number of pirates that do at present infest those 
seas."cviii The Board of Trade and Plantations, in an attempt to ascertain the number of ships needed to 
protect the African coast from pirates in 1716, asked Mr. Pierce and Mr. Benson of the RAC for their 
opinions. They responded, calling for six ships to protect the Company against "Sallee Rovers" and 
"several pirates on the coast of Africa.cix Ten years later, a captain advised the Board of Trade and 
Plantations that "ships of war will be the only proper and effectual protection to the trade."cx 
Likewise, the House of Lords chimed in on the issue of piracy in 1720, discussing a bill that 
would make the recent act of "effectual" suppression of piracy perpetual. ex! Further bills for suppressing 
piracy were introduced in the Commons in March 1728.cxii Additionally, the Commons received several 
petitions claiming abuse from pirates on February 20, 1717. Five days later, the HOC again discussed the 
"methods for suppressing pirates." Then, on the 271h, Mr. Chetwynde of the Lords Commissioners of 
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Trade and Plantations presented his relevant papers concerning piracy.cxiii For years merchants petitioned 
Parliament arguing that "pirates do increase, and gather strength daily" inflicting greater losses "than 
were suffered during the late French wars."cxiv In response to these unending pleas for assistance, the 
Commons frequently sent instructions to ships of war "as they relate to their protecting of His Majesty's 
Subjects for cruising against pirates.cxv As this exhausting list emphasizes, the government dealt with 
issues of piracy and its effects on the slave trade on fairly consistent basis. 
And if incessant pirate attacks were not enough to grasp the government's attention, European 
competition-mainly through acts of privateering-would. On March 6, 1731, the House of Commons 
called in numerous merchants to consider their losses at the hands of the Spanish. Richard Copithorne, 
owner and Captain of the Betty, related his story to his fellow countrymen in a plea for assistance. On 
June 29, 1727, the Betty was "attacked by a Spanish Privateer under Turkish Colours." The privateer, 
according to Copithorne, "charged him with his whole Fire," beginning a violent battle for control of the 
ship. After five hours of fighting, Copithorne watched his deck "blow up," before he was carried offto 
the privateer ship.cxvi One of the more extreme cases of"Spanish Depredations," the case of the Betty had 
significant implications for those engaged in the slave trade. More specifically, cases like the Betty 
provided merchants with apparitions of the dangers of the slave trade. 
A month before the Commons considered the Betty Bristol merchants sent a petition 
"complaining of the Spanish depredations." Liverpool merchants seconded that notion later that month, 
sending their own complaints on February 25th, 1731 . The Commons likewise considered both petitions 
the day before discussing the Betty, calling for a letter to the King requesting a continuance of "his 
Endeavours to prevent the Depredations of the Spaniards for the future." cxvii Continuing in this manner, 
the Commons contemplated a petition from the Ann Galley relating to the "unjust capture and seizure of 
their ship ... and her cargo by the Spanish." Moreover, the Commons considered complaints of the seizure 
and detention ofthe Scipio by the Spanish.cxviii Once again, the Commons responded to these complaints 
and others by relating them to the King in a series of "humble Addresses." cxix 
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The Board of Trade and Plantations dealt with similar issues. In November 1715, four RAC 
members addressed the Board, claiming "their trade was in great danger ... from French and Dutch 
rivals."cxx Likewise, in December 1715, the Board read a letter from a Mr. Harris that posited "the 
assistance of a ship of war was necessary to preserve the interests of the Company there."cxxi Similarly, 
the RAC sent Mr. Hopegood and others to the Board of Trade and Plantations in August 1719 to inform 
the Board of"the ships taken from them by the French in the time ofpeace."cxxii With this in mind, 
merchants and RAC officials alike continuously pestered the Commons and the Board of Trade for 
assistance in dealing with European competition regarding the slave trade. 
While piracy and European competition presented formidable threats to the slave trade, the 
government occasionally recognized other threats, including natural disaster, shipwreck, desertion, and, in 
one instance, mutiny. Dealing with shipwreck, the HOC received a petition for a bill for a "more 
effectual" recovery of ships and goods driven ashore by "distress ofweather."cxxiii Similarly, the 
Commons took measures to prevent seamen from deserting merchant ships on the coast of Africa and 
attempted to thwart mariners' engaging in "private service" or taking any "craft" belonging to any 
merchant ship.cxxiv In other words, parliament sought to curb the hemorrhaging ofboth men and goods 
from slave ships. The House of Lords in 1717 announced a bill to make perpetual an act calling for the 
"preservation of all such ships and goods which shall happen to be found on shore, or stranded," in parts 
of the empire.cxxv Apparently, the government was concerned about the profitability of the trade so much 
so that they would resort to discussing and codifying bills aimed at scavenging stranded ships. Finally, in 
one instance the HOL addressed ship mutinies-whether the Lords directed this proviso toward slave 
insurrections or seamen mutinies is unclear. The specific proviso was added by the Earl of Clarendon to 
the act mentioned above and called for a death sentence to anyone "who shall willingly destroy" a 
ship.cxxvi In sum, the British Government exhibited a strong interest in addressing threats to the 
profitability of the slave trade. The Commons, Lords, and various committees and offices directed their 
efforts toward suppressing piracy, securing reparations from the Spanish and French, and providing 
enough funding to maintain African and West Indian forts to prevent attacks from the former. In all, the 
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British Government directly confronted every significant hazard to the slave trade other than slave 
shipboard insurrections. 
Conclusions 
As we have seen, slave shipboard insurrections played a fundamental role in the British slave 
trade. Because insurrections and other acts of African resistance endangered the success of individual 
voyages, ship captains and mariners found the prevention of such acts the key to continued safety and 
success of the slave trade. London and colonial papers, too, frequently printed accounts of slave 
shipboard insurrection. Thus, those directly involved in the slave trade and readers of periodicals would 
not have been surprised when encountering descriptions of revolt. Others involved in the slave trade, 
such as RAC factors and agents, recognized slave shipboard insurrections as well. Accounts by RAC 
factors and agents, however, occur much less often. Moving upward through the social hierarchy, 
influential members of the RAC rarely addressed insurrections explicitly. Nevertheless, the RAC 
implicitly acknowledged the need to protect against insurrections by frequently requesting assistance from 
the Royal Navy in defending their forts and settlements. Furthermore, ship captains could read between 
the lines of instructions from the RAC and infer that preventing a slave rebellion would be central to the 
success of their voyage. Like the top echelons of the RAC, government circles rarely-if ever-took 
notice of slave shipboard insurrections. Paradoxically, parliament and the various boards and committees 
spent inestimable amounts of time dealing with piracy, European competition, and funding RAC forts and 
settlements-all of which posed threats to the profitability of the burgeoning slave trade. 
The question thus remains: Why did the British government fail to recognize slave shipboard 
insurrections as a formidable threat to the slave trade? Answering this question is problematic, as research 
may never uncover the true motives of those individuals involved with governmental decisions in the 
early eighteenth-century. Still research can uncover the possible factors at play. 
A few essential conclusions may be derived from the evidence. First, one may conclude that the 
government simply had insufficient time to tackle slave shipboard insurrections because they were 
bombarded with other issues relating to the slave trade. While this conclusion has its merits, it not only 
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fails to explain the lack of discussion for shipboard insurrections, but overstates what may simply be an 
effect of the lack of discussion, not a cause. In other words, it is unclear whether the lack of discussion of 
insurrections provided time for the discussion of the other threats to the slave trade, or vice versa. 
The more pessimistic conclusion to be drawn from the paradox holds that government officials 
avoided acknowledging shipboard insurrections because acknowledging such acts would, in effect, 
concede that there were a significant and active "resistance movement," against the slave trade. In other 
words, resistance to the British slave trade by pirates and other Europeans would not pose a moral threat 
to the slave trade because pirates and Europeans were motivated by self-interest and profit. Resistance 
from the victims of the slave trade, however, might be seen as an enquiry into the morality of the slave 
trade.cxxvii While this thesis seems alluring, it is significantly flawed . For example, the complete omission 
of slave shipboard insurrections would have required an unattainable conspiracy with the compliance of 
numerous individuals. Moreover, the government's significant discussion of slave resistance in the West 
Indies counteracts, in some way, this thesis. Presumably, explanations for slave rebellions in the new 
world (which include the uncivilized heathen nature of the slave) could simply be superimposed as a 
justification of shipboard insurrections. Officials, therefore, would be able to discuss and help prevent 
slave shipboard insurrections without widespread moral enquiry into the slave trade. 
Finally, the nature of British society, its conception of race, and its relationship with the slave 
trade help provide yet another conclusion. In Moral Capital, Christopher L. Brown characterizes the 
sudden indignation toward the slave trade by Britons in the second half of the eighteenth-century as a 
"decision to act" on a previously held conception of slavery as "abhorrent."cxxviii While the failure to 
pinpoint the stimulus for this decision represents one of the limitations of Moral Capital, the stimulus that 
led individuals to question the morality of the slave trade may help us make sense the government's lack 
of discussion about slave shipboard insurrections earlier in the century.cxxix Put another way, the 
government's failure to discuss slave shipboard insurrections reflects Britons' relationship with the slave 
trade at the time, which was one of perceived moral injustice, yet reluctant acceptance ofthe system. 
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Lynn Hunt, author of Inventing Human Rights, provides yet another hint as to the factors 
underlying this paradox. Hunt ultimately concludes that a new sense of "empathy" developed in the mid-
18th century, one that fostered from increasing connections between various groups ofinherently different 
people. Novels played an integral role in this transformation by making "the point that all people are 
fundamentally similar because of their inner feelings."cxxx Moreover, it was not until the 1760s that human 
rights-derived from feelings of similarity between humans-and "new attitudes about both torture and 
humane punishment first crystallized."cxxxi For the purposes of this study, these assertions carry enormous 
weight. They hint that in the early 18th century, Britons may not have held the capacity (which ultimately 
could be acquired over time) to feel the equivalent to today's definition of"empathy." This means that 
individuals who ran operations in London, without significant interactions with Africans and with a 
definition of"empathy" that inherently excluded Africans, were unable to see actions made by Africans 
during the middle passage as individual actions legitimized through the common link of humanity. In 
fact, revolting Africans were not seen as individuals at all. Furthermore, members of the government and 
RAC would not have equivocated revolting Africans with a moral challenge to their economic system. 
Neither grand conspiracy nor moral enquiry, it seems, could have occurred. 
Considering the hierarchical levels of concern for shipboard insurrections and Lynn Hunt's 
assertions concerning the British mindset and "human rights" issues, it is clear that this system arose from 
the inability of individuals (absent from direct contact with Africans) to connect acts of resistance with a 
moral challenge to the slave trade. Had they been able to do so, they could have either conspired to 
explicitly ignore these actions or they could have acted to reform their injustices. To the twenty-first 
century observer, these two choices appear the only viable options. Without a new meaning of 
"empathy," however, early 18th century government officials likely failed to characterize acts of 
resistance as a moral challenge-a connection they would make later in the century-and therefore, failed 
to both conspire against or reform to accommodate acts of African resistance. Thus, government officials 
continued to ignore-although not knowingly-shipboard insurrections until new definitions of empathy 
took hold of the popular consciousness, demanding an encompassing moral inquiry into the slave trade. 
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